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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
This paper investigates the effectiveness of demand~and supply-side policies on employment and unemployment in a labour market characterized by insider-outsider conflict. The 'insiders' are the experienced incumbent employees whose positions are protected by labour turnover costs. The 'outsiders' are work~rs who have no such protection. The insiders have market power in the process of wage determination. This power arises ultimately from labour turnover costs that fall on firms, Le. that make it expensive for firms to fire the insiders and hire other workers in their place. The insiders use their market power to pursue their own interests~rather than those of the outsiders.
In our analysis wage and employment decisions are assumed to be made in the following sequence: first the nominal wage is set, given perfect information about the firms' employment responses; then the firms set product prices and decide how many insiders and new recruits to hire, taking the nominal wage as given. In this context, labour market activity can be characterized in terms of two curves: (i) an aggregate labour demand relation, which shows how aggregate labour demand is related to the real wage (measured on the vertical axis) as a result of firms' profit-maximizing employment decisions, and (ii) a wage setting function, which shows the outcome of the wage bargain (in real wage terms) for~my given level of aggregate employment. The intersection of these curves yields the equilibrium level of employment and real wage. Unemployment is simply the difference between labour supply (at the equilibrium real wage) and equilibrium employment.
The distinctive 'insider-outsider' features of our analysis are incorporated mainly in the wage setting function. The labour demand relation differs from the conventional one under imperfect competition in that it explicitly takes into account the labour turnover costs facing the firm (here the marginal revenue product of labour net of turnover costs under wage agreement is set equal to the nominal wage). It is the wage setting function that represents the exercise of insider power in wage bargaining. In the absence of such power the wage setting function would coincide with the labour supply function, and thus the real wage would fall to its market-clearing level at the intersection of the labour supply function and the aggregate labour demand relation, and unemployment would disappear.
The existence of the labour turnover costs falling on the firms implies that the aggregate labour demand relation will contain a vertical segment (an 'area of employment inaction') within which changes in the real wage do not affect the demand for labour. The position of this vertical segment depends solely on the magnitude of the firms' insider workforces, which is historically given and cannot be influenced by current policy measures. By implication, employment is not iii responsive to policy within a particular wage.corridor (whose size is equal to the magnitude of the labour turnover costs). Policy measures are effective only outside this corridor. If the labour market equilibrium falls within the area of employment inaction, then small policy shocks (Le. shocks which do not move the equilibrium point outside the area of inaction) have no effect on employment, whereas large policy shocks do have such an effect.
Since the firms are party to the wage bargains, the wage setting function contains a vertical segment as well. This means that real wages 'jump' or rise discontinuously once employment passes a particular critical level. This phenomenon also has straightforward policy implications.
The supply-side policies that we consider include a variety of measures designed to make workers more profitable and to create greater equality of opportunity in the lab<?ur market: reductions in payroll taxes, reduction in legislated severance payments, government investment in industrial infrastructure, legislation to reduce union power, retraining schemes, reduction of barriers to entry of new firms, measures to open the economy to foreign competition, and tax incentives for profit-sharing. Our analysis provides guidelines for identifying the conditions under which these policies are likely to be effective.
In general, supply-side policies may stimulate employment by making all workers more productive, by reducing the market power of insiders, and by enfranchising the outsiders. Some of these policies, however, reduce the labour income of the current insiders and may therefore induce insider resistance in the form of rent-creating activities that limit the overall employment gains. This specific problem is generally not shared by demand-side policies which improve the employment prospects of the outsiders without making the current insiders worse-off. Demand-side policies, however, face other difficulties.
The demand-side policies that we consider are the traditional Keynesian fiscal polices, for example, government expenditures in the product and labour markets, taxes and transfer payments. We inquire whether there are transmission mechanisms whereby variations in aggregate product demand affect employment even when wages and prices are set flexibly under conditions of imperfect competition.
Our analysis therefore suggests that when wages and prices are perfectly flexible and insiders wield power in the labour market, then demand-side policies in the product market are unlikely to have a pronounced effect on employment unless these policies stimulate labour productivity, the entry of firms, capital utilization, or investment. In particular, analysis suggests three potentially important channels of transmission, each of which has noteworthy policy implications and has a weaker impact on employment under insider-outsider conditions than under market-clearing conditions: iv -a short-run channel, whereby changes in product demand affect the level of capital utilization which, in turn, affects the marginal product of labour. This channel is open whenever excess capital capacity exists; it does not depend on the level of unemployment. By implication, an increase in government product demand may lead to an increase in employment at constant or rising real wages when there is excess capital capacity, but not once full capacity utilization has been reached.
-In the medium run, there is a channel involving the entry (and exit) of firms. In order for this channel to be operative, it is important that the demand-side policy be supported by the relevant supply-side policy, viz. the removal of barriers to the entry of firms. There is also a medium-run channel whereby a rise in product demand stimulates net investment, and this channel is operative only when the rate of capital utilization is sufficiently high.
-The long-run channel involves the build-up or run-down of industrial infrastructure. Here, the policy operates simultaneously on the demand side (via changes in government spending) and the supply side (via changes in the economy's production possibility frontier). Our analysis implies that demand-side policies with such supply-side effects may have a much larger impact on employment than policies (such as changes in transfer payments or government consumption) which do not affect labour productivity. We show that supply-side policies may enhance the effectiveness of demand management policies regarding employment. In this sense, the demand-and supply-side policies can be complementary.
Introduction
This paper examines what a government can do to stimulate employment In an economy where unemployment arises out of a confl let of Interest between insiders and outsiders.
For this purpose, we construct a simple Insider-outsider model In which nominal wages are the outcome of bargaining between firms and their insiders. This model extends the scope of previous insider-outsider models (e.g. Blanchard and Summers (1986) , Llndbeck and Snower (1984 , 1988 , 1989a ,
In which nominal wages are assumed to be set unl laterally by the Insiders.
In this context we seek to Identify channels whereby macroeconomic policies can Influence employment and unemployment and to assess the effectiveness of demand-and supply-side pol icles in this regard.
The paper may also be seen as a I Ink In a chain of research projects exploring the Implications of labor turnover costs and Insider market power for labor market activity. In a static context, some of our previous work~e.g . Llndbeckand Snower (1984 ), (1987a and (1989a)) has examined the simultaneous ,operation of three causal effects:
(I) how "lumpy" labor turnover costs (I.e. costs that remain finitely large as labor turnover rates approach zero) affect firms' employment decisions, at predetermined wages, (I I) how these costs generate market power for the Insiders, and (I I I) how Insider market power affects wages and employment.
These effects have also been analyzed Individually, but not In unison, within dynamic settings. In particular, Blanchard and Summers (1986) , Gottfrles and Horn (1986) , and others have Investigated the effect of Insider power on employment (relationship (I I I)) presupposing that
Insiders have market power. Bentol I la and Bertola (1988 ), Bertola (1989 and (Informally) Llndbeck and Snower (1989a, ch.11, sec.1,2) examine the effect of labor turnover costs on employment (relationship (I}) In the absence of Insider power. 
where P Is the price of the product, Q Is the aggregate product demand, -n Is the price elasticity of product demand, and A is a shift parameter of the product demand function. We assume that this parameter can be influenced by demand-side policies.
Each firm's total entrants: employment (n) comprises n l Insiders and nE (2) n = n I + nE' Let m be the stock of Insiders which the firm has inheritted from the previous time period.
This stock is historically given.
It depends on last period's stock of Insiders (m_ 1 ), the quit rate (q), and the proportion of last period's entrants who become Insiders In the current period (6):2
Entrants are assumed to turn Into Insiders after one period of employment.
Thus, the firm's Insider employment cannot exceed its current Insider stock: nl~m.
Assuming -for simplicity -that Insiders and entrants are equally productlve,3 we let the firm have the following production 1The assumption of homogeneous products is made only for expositional simplicity. It Is straightforward to extend our analysis to the case of differentiated products. Our qualitative results would sti II hold If we made the more general assumption that q=f(n), were f'>O and f"<O. By contrast, the product demand funct Ion (1) Is given in terms of a more genera I funct Iona I form, I n order to enab I e us to I nqu I re (i n Sect Ion 8), under what general conditions It is possible for demand management policies to affect labor market actiVity.
5 AI I workers within a firm are assumed to receive the same nominal wage (W).
This Is not an assumption of substance; our only reason for making It Is that it provides a simple channel whereby Insider-Induced wage Increases lead to reductions in employment.
To see this, suppose instead that the new entrants to the firm receive a wage which is independent of the insider wage.
In that case, the firm's overal I level of employment Is such as to equate the entrants' marginal revenue product with their wage, and consequently this employment agreement has been reached, the firm faces only one type of labor turnover cost: a firing cost, which may take the form of, say, legally mandated severance payor the firm's expected cost of Implementing agreed firing procedures. Let~be the magnitude of the firing cost per Insider fired.
The firm's total cost of firing is
The real marginal F· (m -n l ), where F=~for m>n l , and F=O for nl~m.
firing cost, i=~/P Is assumed constant.
Given the nominal wage agreement W, the firm's decision-making problem Is to maximize Its profit subject to the constraints described above:
where the firm's decision variables are q, P, n, ni' and nE'
The solution to this problem 6 may be expressed as a relation between the firm's tota I Iabor demand and the rea I wage, wh Ich we cal I the "Iabor demand relation", pictured In Figure 1 . The three segments of this relation correspond to the following scenarios:
-The "Hir-in8 Scenar-io": Here the nominal wage Is low enough to Induce the firm to set its employment level above Its initial insider workforce. Thus, some entrants are hired and no Insiders are fired. 7 Consequently firing costs do not arise. The firm sets Its total employment so tha t the marg i na I va I ue product of Iabor Is equa I to the nom I na I Iabor costs:
level cannot be affected by changes In the insider wage. 
o 01-1
where nO Is the firm's profit-maximizing level of employment. The parameter e Is lerner's Index of monopoly power (i .e., the price-cost margln):8
where the conjectural variations coefficient (v), the elasticity of product demand (n) , and the number of firms In the economy are assumed to be taken as exogenously given by the firm when It makes its pricing and employment decisions.
Condition (7) obviously implies the following labor demand relatlon 9 In the Hiring Scenario:
Since the Hiring Scenario occurs only when nO>m, the nominal wage must then be less than a critical level:
where the constant K 1 is
by equat Ions (4), (5), and (9).
-The "Firina Scenario";
Here the nominal wage Is high enough to Induce the firm to set Its employment level beneath its Initial Insider workforce. Thus, no < m.
entrants are hired and some Insiders are fired, at a firing cost ofp er Insider. By Impl icatlon, total employment Is set so that the nominal wage is equal to the sum of the marginal value product of labor and the marginal firing cost:
This condition implies the following labor demand relation:
8 sy the first order condition (7), the firm's marginal cost of production Is
ThUS, the price-cost margin, (P-C)/P. is e.
9 Note that equation (8) is not a labor demand curve in the perfectly competitive sense, since both nand P are endogenous to the firm.
Since the Firing Scenario occurs only when nO<m, the nominal wage must exceed the following critical level:
where the constant K 2 is given by
by equa t ions (4), (5) and (11).
-The "Retention Scenario";
Here the the nominal wage Is such as to Induce the firm to retain Its initial Insider workforce, but to hire no entrants.
(12) nO m.
By equations (9b) and (llb), it Is clear that this happens whenever the nominal wage fal Is into the following range:
Equations (9) -(12a) wi I I serve as our description of the firm's employment and pricing decisions. We now turn to the wage-setting process, where these decisions are taken into account.
Wage Determination
As noted, the nominal wage (W) is taken to be the outcome of a Nash bargain between each firm and Its Insiders. We proceed to describe the bargaining objectives of the firm and its insiders and then specify the bargaining problem.
a. The Firm.' s Objec t i'Ue
We let the firm's objective be the maximlzatlon of the "firm surplus", which Is the difference between the profit earned under agreement In the wage negotiations (n) and under disagreement (no).
As shown below, the firm's Insiders have an incentive to engage in rent-creating activities when there is disagreement, but not when there Is agreement. These rent-creating activities come in many guises.
For Instance, the insiders may work-to-rule, be uncooperative 7 in team production, engage in I itigation, or go on strike. 10 For simpl icity, this paper does not consider the employment effects of government pol icles operating via the Influence of these pol icies on insiders' rent-seeking activities under disagreement. Accordingly, we make the assumption that when the insiders engage in these activities, the firm earns a constant fraction 1-X (where 0 < X < 1), of its profit under agreement. 11
The parameter X may be understood as a measure of the magnitude of insiders' rent-creating activities under disagreement.
Thus, the firm's surplus may be expressed In the fol Jowing simple way:
x·n.
b. The Insiders' Objective
The Insiders seek to maximize the "Insider surplus", which Is the difference between the real wage' income that the Insiders receive under agreement and their threat-point Income.
The real wage relevant to the insiders is the consti~ption wage:
(W/P a ), where P a Is the consumer price Index. We assume~hat each
Individual firm exerts a negligible Influence on the consumer price index, and thus P a Is exogenous to the insiders' decision making.
The Insiders' real "threat-point wage" Is denoted by wo' For simplicity, we take Wo to be a constant, that depends on al I the various determinants of the Insiders' Incomes in the case of disagreement In the wage negotiations: the magnitude of strike fund payments, the level of support forthcoming from family and friends during the dispute, the opportunity of finding temporary, Informal work during the dispute, the reservation wage, and so on. 12
10 For a discussion of these activities in the context of the Insider-outsider theory, see Llndbeck and Snower (1984a, 1988a.) 11 ThlS Is an assumption of substance.
In general we would expect that one channel whereby demand-and supply-side policies may affect wages and employment Is by Influencing the magnitude of Insiders' rent-creating activities.
However, our assumption that X is a constant Impl ies that its value does not affect the outcome of the Nash bargain over the nominal wage.
12 Note that the Insiders' threat-point wage (Wo) is not necessarily
We assume that each firm has a seniority system (viz, an ordering whereby It fires employees), and that a proportion A (0~A~1) of the firm's most senior Insiders are actually Involved in the wage negotiation process.
These senior Insiders use their market power to maximize just their own surplus, rather than the surplus of other workers as wet I. We assume that they seek to drive their nominal wage as high as possible, subject to the constraint that none of them Is fired. This constraint, which we cal I the "relative profitabi I Ity constraint", specifies that the nominal wage must not exceed the sum of the outsiders' reservation wage (R) and the labor turnover cost
W~R+F,
for otherwise the firm would have an incentive to replace Its Insiders by outsiders.
Since the firm retains all its senior Insiders, Aom, the surplus of the senior insiders is
where A and m are exogenously given for each nominal wage negotiation and thus do not affect the outcome of this negotiation.
c. Waee Determination
The bargaining problem of the firm and its Insiders Is (15) Maximize wao~1-a,
where w is the Insiders' objective in the negotiations,~is the firm's objective, and "a" Is a constant (0 < a~1) that represents the bargaining strength of the insiders relative to that of the firm.
The first-order condition for an interior solution to the Nash bar g a i n I n g pro b Iem (1 5 ) i s
where w* is the nominal wage that emerges from the negotiation processo This condition simply states that the relative elasticities of the Insiders' and firm's objectives with respect to the wage must equal to their reservation wage (W r ).
In fact the threat-point wage must be greater than or equal to the reservation wage: Wo~w r ' for otherwise the insiders would quit the firm.
9 be equal to their relative bargaining strengths.
SUbstituting the firm's objective (13) and the workers' obJective (14) into (16), we
o a n which states that the difference between real labor remuneration (Inclusive of payrol I taxes) under agreement and disagreement is proportional to the real profit per employee (with the factor of proport Ional I ty be I ng the rat 10 of the barga I n I ng strengths).
We may now derive the mlcroeconomlc "wage setting function", which describes the negotiated wage at any given level of employment by the firm. I n the HI ring and Retent Ion Scenar Ios, the firm's rea I profit per employee Is (17b)
SUbstituting equation (17b) into (17a), we obtain the following expression for the real product wage that is the outcome of the firm's price setting and the nominal wage negotiations between the firm and its Insiders under the Hiring and Retention Scenarios:
. o a Analogously, In the Firing Scenario the firm's real profit per employee Is
SUbstituting (17c) into (17a), we find the following expression for the real product wage under the Firing Scenario:
+ (1-a) -wo· (P a /P )-Observe that~In al I three scenarios, the above real product wage (for any given level of employment by the firm) is greater, the larger the Insiders' bargaining strength (a), the real threat-point wage (Wo), the productivity coefficient B, and the payroll tax rate (T).
In addition, for the Firing Scenario, the above real wage Is pos I t Ive Iy re Iated' to the magn I tUde of the fir i ng cost per worker.
Equations (18a) and (18b) comprise the microeconomlc wage setting function.
Our model of real wage and employment determination at the microeconomic level of the firm is given by equations (9)-(12a) and (16a)-(18b).
We now proceed to incorporate this analysis into a simple model of the aggregate labor market. for the pol Icy analysis which fol lows. we wl I I assume that the wage setting function Is upward-sloping.
By equations (18) Observe that. In contrast to some highly simplified
Insider-outsider models. our model does not Imply that a positive quit rate among Insiders necessarily leads to a progressive decline of firms' Insider work forces with the passage of time. This is so because Insiders do not set their wages unl laterally. but rather participate In wage negotiations with firms. which exert downward 17 pressure on wages.
In the context of the aggregate labor market described above. we now inquire how government policies can affect labor market activity.
16 1n the extreme case where Insiders have no bargaining power at al I (a=O). the negotiated real product wage Is equal to the the real threat-point wage: (W*/P) = wo·(Pa/P).
170f course other reasons are conceivable as wel I.
Insider may have an Incentive to set wages sufficiently low to permit the entry of new employees when there are Increasing returns to labor. when Insiders an entrants are engaged In complementary production activities. or when insiders cannot predict the precise position of the labor demand curve when wages are set.
(See Begg (1988) . Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Llndbeck and Snower (1987a) .) Furthermore. Llndbeck and Snower ( 1984 . 1987a . 1988 argue that the Ins i ders' wage cannot r I se above the sum of the entrants' wage and the relevant labor turnover costs. for otherwise the firm would have an Incentive to replace Insiders by entrants.
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Supply-side Policies
It Is convenient to group the supply-side policies under the following three headings:
I. po~Icles designed to make al I workers -Insiders, entrants, and outsiders alike -more profitable to the,flrms, to be cal led "employment-promoting policies", I I. policies which reduce the Insiders' market power, which we cal I "power-reducing policies", and I I I. pol icles designed to enfranchise outsiders In the process of wage negotiations, to be cal led "enfranchising policies". Here the distinctive Insider-outsider features of our analys1s have a special role to play In determining the effectiveness of economic pol Icy.
Finally, as we have seen in the previous section, the aggregate wage-setting curve may be upward-or downward-sloping, but Its slopeIs always of greater magnitude than that of the aggregate labor demand curve; whereas the slope of the aggregate labor demand curve Is unambiguously negative. Thus, for both the Hiring and the Firing Scenarios, policies whose Influence Is attributable to the distinctive
Inslder~outslder features of our analysis -in the sense that they lead to a shift of the aggregate wage setting function -Invariably move the real wage and employment in opposite directions. In particular, an upward shift of the wage setting curve leads to a rise
In the real wage and a fal I In employment, whereas a downward shift of this curve has the opposite effects.
On the other hand, policies whose effectiveness does not depend on Insider power -those which shift the labor demand curve but leave the wage setting curve unchanged -have an ambiguous effect on the real wage, since the slope of the wage setting function Is ambiguous.
This ambiguity Is of no particular concern to us here, since only the policies which operate through insider-outsider channels are the~focus of attention in this paper. To fix ideas In the pol icy analysis below, we wl I I assume that the wage setting function Is upward-sloping (so that an upward shift of the labor demand curve leads to a rise in the real wage). 19
190bserve that, even In the absence of the assumption that the wage setting curve Is upward-sloping, the employment effects of these policies Is unambiguous, since the slope of the wage setting curve-Is of greater magnitude than that of the labor demand curve.
(Thus an upward shift of the labor demand curve Invariably leads to a rise In employment, and obversely for a downward shift. As result both the aggregate wage setting curve and the aggregate labor demand curve shift upwards. Consequently the real wage rlses,21 whereas the change in employment Is ambiguous.
Observe that government infrastructure Investment has a more powerful impact on real wages and a weaker impact on employment in our insider-outsider context than under the analogous market-clearing conditions. The reason is that this pol icy raises the wage setting curve In our model, whereas It leaves the labor supply curve unchanged.
A fa~~i n the payro~~tax rate may be portrayed by a fal I in the parameter T. As result, the aggregate labor demand relation shifts upwards In al cost of labor.
three scenarios, since the pol Icy reduces the marginal
The wage sett I ng funct ion sh i fts upwards as we I I in these scenarios, since the pol Icy raises the firm's profit surplus.
By Implication, a fall in the payroll tax rate raises the real wage, but the change In aggregate 'employment Is ambiguous.
Thus we can see that a fa I I I n the payro I I tax rate prov Ides a stronger stimulus ,to the real wage and a weaker stimulus to employment 20SInce our model is not one of economy-wide general equl I ibrlum, we w i I I I gnore how these var lous po I i c i es are financed.
22 1n al lour pol icy exercises we assume that the ratio of consumer to producer prices remains unchanged, and thus -in the absence of a change in the payrol I tax -the consumption wage and the production wage in our model always move in the same direction.
22Under the Retent ion Scenar 10, c Iear I y, there I s on I y a fa I I I n the real wage. 
b. Power-Reducina Policies
There Is a wide variety of policies which serve to reduce the market power of Insiders, ranging from legal restrictions on strikes and picketing to relaxing job-.security legislation (e.g. laws to reduce severance payor to simplify firing procedures). In the context of our model, these pol icles may be portrayed In terms of (I) a fal I In the "a", measuring the relative bargaining strength of the Insiders, and (il) a fall In the real firing cost per insider, i. This could be a serious obstacle to Implementing these pol icles.
Since the Insiders stand to lose, they may be expected to resist these policies by engaging In more rent-creating activities -ranging from harassment of workers who seek to gain jobs through underbidding, to the withdrawal of cooperation from such workers In the process to production, to staging strikes and work-to-rule actions, to litigation over firing procedures. In particular, power-reducing policies may
give the Insiders Incentives to engage In rent-seeking activities by making these activities more effective by generating an income effect. 
c. Enfranchisins Policies
The primary purpose of the enfranchising policies Is to give the outsiders a better chance of gaining employment and thereby become "enfranchlzed" In the wage negotiation process. These policies can take many forms. We consider a few prominent examples.
The labor market effects of vocational trainins prosrams -
provided or subsidized by the government -may be usefully compared with those of government infrastructure Investment (discussed above).
Whereas the Infrastructure Investment may be expected to raise both the productivity of the current employees and the potential productivity of the outsiders, the vocational training programs are aimed expressly at the latter. Obviously, the Impact of such programs depends on the degree to which workers' ski I Is are general, rather than firm-specific. The greater the relative Importance of general ski I Is, the more outsiders may be enfranchlzed through the programs.
A formal analysis of these programs requires us to consider a broader class of production functions tha~that contained In our The second type of pol Icy Is concerned exclusively with the transmission of pol Icy Impulses from the product to the labor market.
In the Keyneslan literature, this transmission depends on the assumption of either sluggish nominal wages, or sluggish prices, or both.
We do not dispute that the Keyneslan channels of pol Icy transmission from the product to the labor market may operate under the various circumstances under which wages and prices may be expected to be sluggish (e.g. government price fixing or long-term wage contracting To see whether the rise In A shifts the labor demand function (In real wage -employment space), we Inquire whether it affects the firm's profit-maximizing level of employment at any given real wage.
In other words, we ask whether a rise in A alters the profit-maximizing employment level when the nominal wage (W, which is exogenous to the firm's decision making) rises proportionately to the price level (P, which Is set by the firm). For this purpose, let us return to the firm's marginal conditions, in equations (7) and (10) proportionately to the marginal revenue product of labor (as equations (7) and (10) show). By Implication, the aggregate labor demand relation is not affected by the rise in A, provided that e, T, B, and al I remain unchanged. This can be seen at a glance by observing that the parameter A does not appears neither In the aggregate labor demand relation, as given by (10a)-(10c).
Nor does the parameter A appear In the wage setting functions ( 1Ba) and (1 Bb) . In other words, demand management policies which shift the parameter A -without affecting the relative bargaining strength of the Insiders vis-a-vis their firm (a), the threat-point wage (Wo), and the production function parameters (B and~) -have no effect on the wage setting function in real wage-employment space.
The reason is that a proportional change In P and W leads to a proportional change in the bargaining objectives of the firms and their Insiders and no change In the relative profltabl I Ity constraint.
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Thus It leaves the real wage that emerges from the bargaining process Is unchanged as wel I.
We may conclude that a demand-side pol Icy whose only Impact effect Is to change the demand parameter A -without simultaneously affecting the price elasticity of product demand, the number of firms
In the economy, the marginal product of labor, the relative bargaining strength of the Insiders vis-a-vis their firms, and the threat-point wage -has no effect on employment and the real wage In the capital stock may further raise the marginal product of labor.
(A formal analysis of this pol Icy effect Is given In Llndbeck and Snower (1987b) and lies beyond the scope of our model.)
Our discussion above suggests three potentially Important channels 26 For a detal led analysis of this transmission mechanism, see Llndbeck and Snower (1987b Elsewhere, I t has bee~shownthat these persistent effects of policies may be "symmetric" and/or "asymmetric". 
